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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of replay attacks on
a control system. We assume an attacker wishes to dis-
rupt the operation of a control system in steady state.
In order to inject an exogenous control input without
being detected the attacker will hijack the sensors, ob-
serve and record their readings for a certain amount
of time and repeat them afterwards while carrying out
his attack. This is a very common and natural attack
(we have seen numerous times intruders recording and
replaying security videos while performing their attack
undisturbed) for an attacker who does not know the dy-
namics of the system but is aware of the fact that the
system itself is expected to be in steady state for the du-
ration of the attack. We assume the control system to
be a discrete time linear time invariant gaussian system
applyinganinﬁnitehorizon LinearQuadraticGaussian
(LQG) controller. We also assume that the system is
equipped with a χ2 failure detector. The main contri-
butions of the paper, beyond the novelty of the problem
formulation, consist in 1) providing conditions on the
feasibility of the replay attack on the aforementioned
system and 2) proposing a countermeasure that guar-
antees a desired probability of detection (with a ﬁxed
false alarm rate) by trading off either detection delay
or LQG performance, either by decreasing control ac-
curacy or increasing control effort.
1. Introduction
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) refer to the embed-
ding of widespread sensing, computation, communi-
cation and control into physical spaces [1]. Applica-
tion areas are as diverse as aerospace, chemical pro-
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cesses, civil infrastructure, energy, manufacturing and
transportation. Many of these applications are safety-
critical. The availability of cheap communication tech-
nologies as the internet makes such infrastructures sus-
ceptibleto cybersecuritythreats. National securitymay
be affectedas infrastructuressuch as the power grid, the
telecommunicationnetworks are vital to the normal op-
eration of our society. Any successful attack may sig-
niﬁcantlyhamperthe economy,the environmentor may
even lead to loss of human life. As a result, the role
security of CPS is of primary importance to guarantee
safe operation of CPS. The research communityhas ac-
knowledgedthe importance of addressing the challenge
of designing secure CPS [2] [3].
The impact of attacks on the cyber physical sys-
tems is addressed in [4]. The authors consider two pos-
sibleclasses ofattacks onCPS: Denial ofService(DoS)
and deception attacks. The DoS attack prevents the ex-
changeof information,usually either sensor readings or
control inputs between subsystems, while the deception
attack affects the data integrity of packets by modify-
ing their payloads. A robust feedback control design
against DoS attack is further discussed in [5]. We feel
that the deception attack can be subtler than DoS attack
as it is in principle more difﬁcult to detect and it has
not adequately addressed. Hence, in this paper, we will
developa methodologyto detect a particularkind of de-
ception attack.
A signiﬁcant amount of research effort has been
carried out to analyze, detect and handle failures in
CPS. Sinopoli et al. study the impact of random packet
drops on controller and estimator performance [6] [7].
In [8], the author reviews several failure detection al-
gorithm in dynamic systems. Results from robust con-
trol [9], a discipline that aims to design controllers
that function properly under uncertain parameter or un-
known disturbances, is applicable to some CPS scenar-
ios. However, a large proportion of the literature as-
sumes that the failure is either random or benign. On
the other hand, a cunning attacker can carefully design
his attackstrategyanddeceivebothdetectorsandrobust
controllers. Hence, the applicability of failure detection
algorithms is questionable in the presence of a smart at-
tacker.
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978-1-4244-5871-4/09/$26.00 ©2009 IEEE 911In this paper,we studythe effectof a data replayat-
tack on control systems. We assume an attacker wishes
to disrupt the operation of a control system in steady
state. Inordertoinjectanexogenouscontrolinputwith-
out being detected the attacker will hijack the sensors,
observe and record their readings for a certain amount
of time and repeat them afterwards while carrying out
his attack. This is a very common and natural attack
(we have seen numerous times intruders recording and
replaying security videos while performing their attack
undisturbed) for an attacker who does not know the dy-
namics of the system but is aware that the system it-
self is expected to be in steady state for the duration of
the attack. We assume the control system to be a dis-
crete time linear time invariant (LTI) Gaussian system
applying an inﬁnite horizon Linear Quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) controller. We also assume that the system is
equipped with a χ2 failure detector. The main contri-
butions of the paper, beyond the novelty of the problem
formulation, consist in providing conditions on the fea-
sibilityofthereplayattackontheaforementionedattack
and suggesting a countermeasure that guarantees a de-
sired probability of detection (with a ﬁxed false alarm
rate) by trading off either detection delay or LQG cost,
i.e. either by decreasing control accuracy or increasing
control effort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we provide the problem formulation by re-
visiting and adaptingKalman ﬁlter, LQG controller and
χ2 failure detector to our scenario. In Section 3, we
deﬁne the threat model of replay attack and analyze its
effect on the control schemes discussed in Section 2. In
Section 4 we discuss one possible countermeasure, the
efﬁciency of which is illustrated by several numerical
examples in Section 5. Finally Section 6 concludes the
paper. The appendix contains several proofs, some of
which had to be removed due to space constraints.
2. Problem Formulation
In this section we will formulate the problem by
deriving the Kalman ﬁlter, the LQG controller and χ2
detector for our case. We will use the notation below
for the remainder of the paper.
Consider the following linear, time invariant (LTI)
system whose state dynamics are given by
xk+1 = Axk +Buk+wk, (1)
where xk ∈ ℝn is the vector of state variables at time k,
wk ∈ ℝn is the process noise at time k and x0 is the ini-
tial state. We assume wk, x0 are independent Gaussian
random variables, x0 ∼ N (¯ x0, Σ), wk ∼ N (0, Q).
A sensor network is monitoring the system de-
scribed in (1). At each step all the sensor readings are
sent to a base station. The observation equation can be
written as
yk =Cxk +vk, (2)
where yk ∈ ℝm is a vector of measurements from the
sensors and vk ∼ N (0, R) is the measurement noise
independent of x0 and wk.
2.1. Kalman Filter
It is well known that for the system of equations
(1), (2) the Kalman ﬁlter is the optimal estimator as
it provides the minimum variance unbiased estimate of
the state xk given the previous observations y0,...,yk.
The Kalman ﬁlter is recursive and it takes the following
form:
ˆ x0∣−1 = ¯ x0, P0∣−1 = Σ, (3)
ˆ xk+1∣k = Aˆ xk∣k +Buk, Pk+1∣k = APk∣kAT +Q,
Kk = Pk∣k−1CT(CPk∣k−1CT +R)−1,
ˆ xk∣k = ˆ xk∣k−1+Kk(yk −Cˆ xk∣k−1), Pk∣k = Pk∣k−1−KkCPk∣k−1.
Although the Kalman ﬁlter uses a time varying gain Kk,
it is known that this gain will converge if the system
is detectable. In practice the Kalman gain usually con-
verges in a few steps. Hence, let us deﬁne
P ≜ lim
k→∞
Pk∣k−1, K ≜ PCT(CPCT +R)−1. (4)
Since control systems usually run for a long time,
we can assume to be running at steady state from the
beginning. Hence, we assume initial condition Σ = P.
In that case, the Kalman ﬁlter is a ﬁxed gain estimator,
taking the following form
ˆ x0∣−1 = ¯ x0, ˆ xk+1∣k = Aˆ xk∣k +Buk, ˆ xk∣k = ˆ xk∣k−1+K(yk−Cˆ xk∣k−1).
2.2. Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) Opti-
mal Control
Given the state estimation ˆ xk∣k, the LQG controller
minimizes the following objective function1:
J = min lim
T→∞
E
1
T
"
T−1
∑
k=0
(xT
kWxk +uT
kUuk)
#
, (5)
whereW,U are positive semideﬁnite matrices and uk is
measurable with respect to y0,...,yk, i.e. uk is a func-
tion of previous observations. It is well known that the
1Here we just discuss the case of inﬁnite horizon LQG control
problem.
912solution of the above minimization problemwill lead to
a ﬁxed gain controller, which takes the following form:
uk = u∗
k = −(BTSB+U)−1BTSAˆ xk∣k, (6)
where u∗
k is the optimal control input and S satisﬁes the
following Riccati equation
S = ATSA+W −ATSB(BTSB+U)−1BTSA. (7)
Let us deﬁne L ≜ −(BTSB +U)−1BTSA, then u∗
k =
Lxk∣k.
Theobjectivefunctiongivenbytheoptimalestima-
tor and controller is in our case is
J =trace(SQ)+trace[(ATSA+W −S)(P−KCP)].
(8)
2.3. χ2 Failure Detector
The χ2 detector [10] is widely used to detect
anomalies in control systems. Before introducing the
detector, we will characterize the probability distribu-
tion of the residue of the Kalman ﬁlter:
Theorem 1. For the LTI system deﬁned in (1) with
Kalman ﬁlter and LQG controller, the residues yi −
Cˆ xi∣i−1 of Kalman ﬁlter are i.i.d. Gaussian distributed
with 0 meanand covarianceP, where P =CPCT +R.
Proof. Due to space constraints, we cannot give the
proof here. Please refer to [10] for the details.
By Theorem 1, we know that the probability to get
the sequence yk−T +1,...,yk when the system is operat-
ing normally is
P(yk−T +1,...,yk) =
￿
1
(2π)N/2∣P∣
￿T
exp(−
1
2
gk),
(9)
where
gk =
k
∑
i=k−T +1
(yi−Cˆ xi∣i−1)TP−1(yi−Cˆ xi∣i−1). (10)
When this probability is low, it means that the system is
likely to be subject to certain failure. In order to check
the probability,we only need to computegk. Hence, the
χ2 detector at time k takes the following form
gk =
k
∑
i=k−T +1
(yi−Cˆ xi∣i−1)TP−1(yi−Cˆ xi∣i−1)≶threshold,
(11)
where T is the window size of detection. By Theo-
rem 1, the left of the equation is χ2 distributed with
mT degrees of freedom2. Hence, it is easy to calcu-
late the false alarm rate from χ2 distribution. If gk is
greater than the threshold, then the detector will trigger
an alarm.
3. Replay Attack against Control System
In this section, we assume that a malicious third
party wants to break the control system described in
Section 2. We will deﬁne an attack model similar to
the replay attack in computer security and analyze the
feasibility of such kind of attack on the control system.
We will later generalize our analysis to other classes of
control systems.
We suppose the attacker has the capability to per-
form the following actions:
1. It can inject a control input ua
k into the system any-
time.
2. It knows all sensor readings and can modify them.
We will denote the reading modiﬁed by the at-
tacker by y′
k.
Given these abilities, the attacker will implement
the following attack strategy, which can be divided into
two stages:
1. The attacker records a sufﬁcient number of yks
without giving any input to the system.
2. The attacker gives a sequence of desired control
input while replaying the previous recorded yks.
Remark 1. The attack on the sensors can be done by
breaking the cryptography algorithm. Another way to
perform an attack, which we think is much harder to
defend, is to induce false sensor readings by changing
the local conditions around it. Such attack may be easy
to carry out when sensors are spatially distributed in
remote locations.
Remark 2. We assume that the attacker has control
over all the sensors. This could be accomplished for a
smaller system consisting of few sensors. For a large
system, usually the whole system can be break down
to several small and weakly coupled subsystems. For
example consider the temperature control problem in a
building. Onecanthinkof thetemperatureineachroom
as subsystems, which will hardly affects each other.
Hence, the attacker only needs to control the sensors of
a small subsystem in order to perform the replay attack
on the subsystem.
2The degrees of freedom is from the deﬁnition of χ2 distribution.
Please refer to [11] for more details.
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ciple, if the attacker has more knowledge of the sys-
tem model, the controller design, it can perform a much
more subtle and powerful attack. However, to identify
the underlying model of the system is usually a hard
problem and not all the attackers have the knowledge
and power to do so. Hence, we will only focus on a sim-
ple, easy to implement attack strategy which is easy to
implement.
Remark 4. When the system is under attack, the cen-
tral computer will be unable to perform close loop con-
trol on the system since the sensory information is not
available. Hence, we cannotguaranteeanycontrol per-
formance of the system under this attack. Any counter-
attack will need to be able to detect the attack.
It is worth noticing that in the attacking stage, the
goalof theattacker is to makethe fakereadingsy′
ks look
normal yks. Replaying the previous yks is just the easi-
est way to achieve this goal. There are other methods,
suchasmachinelearning,togenerateafakesequenceof
readings. In order to providea uniﬁed frameworkto an-
alyze such kind of attack, we can thinkof y′
ks as the out-
put of the following virtual system (this does not neces-
sarily mean that the attacker runs a virtual system):
x′
k+1 = Ax′
k+Bu′
k+w′
k, y′
k =Cx′
k +v′
k,
ˆ x′
k+1∣k = Aˆ x′
k∣k+Bu′
k, ˆ x′
k+1∣k+1 = ˆ x′
k+1∣k +K(y′
k− ˆ x′
k+1∣k),
u′
k = Lˆ x′
k∣k,
with initial conditions x′
0 and ˆ x′
0∣−1. If the attacker actu-
allylearnsthesystem, thenthevirtualsystemwill bethe
system the attacker runs. For the replay attack, suppose
that the attacker records the sequence yks from time t
time. Then the virtual system is just a time shifted ver-
sion of the real system, with x′
k = xt+k, ˆ x′
k∣k = ˆ xt+k∣t+k
(Note that the attacker may not know xt+k and ˆ xt+k∣t+k).
Suppose the system is under attack and the de-
fender is using the χ2 detector to perform intrusion de-
tection. We will rewrite the estimation of the Kalman
ﬁlter ˆ xk∣k−1 in the following recursive way:
ˆ xk+1∣k = Aˆ xk∣k +Buk = (A+BL)ˆ xk∣k
= (A+BL)[ˆ xk∣k−1+K(y′
k−Cˆ xk∣k−1)]
= (A+BL)(I−KC)ˆ xk∣k−1+(A+BL)Ky′
k.
(12)
For the virtual system, it is easy to see that the same
equation holds true for ˆ x′
k∣k−1:
ˆ x′
k+1∣k = (A+BL)(I−KC)ˆ x′
k∣k−1+(A+BL)Ky′
k. (13)
Deﬁne A ≜ (A+BL)(I−KC), then3
ˆ xk∣k−1− ˆ x′
k∣k−1 = A k(ˆ x0∣−1− ˆ x′
0∣−1). (14)
Deﬁne ˆ x0∣−1− ˆ x′
0∣−1 ≜ ζ. Now write the residue as
y′
k−Cˆ xk∣k−1 = (y′
k −Cˆ x′
k∣k−1)+CA kζ, (15)
and
gk =
k
∑
i=k−T +1
h
(y′
i−Cˆ x′
k∣k−1)TP−1(y′
i−Cˆ x′
k∣k−1)
+2(y′
i−Cˆ x′
k∣k−1)TP−1CA iζ +ζT(A i)TCTP−1CA iζ
i
.
(16)
By the deﬁnition of the virtual system, we know that
y′
k −Cˆ x′
k∣k−1 follows exactly the same distribution as
yk−Cˆ xk∣k−1. Hence, if A is stable, the second term and
the third term in (16) will converge to 0. As a result,
y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k−1 will converges to the same distribution as
yk−Cˆ xk∣k−1, and the detectionrate given by χ2 detector
will be the same as false alarm rate. In other words, the
detector is useless.
On the other hand, if A is unstable, the attacker
cannot replay y′
k for long since gk will soon become
unbounded. In this case, the system is resilient to the
replay attack, as the detector will be able to detect the
attack. It turns out the feasibility result derived for a
special estimator, controller, and detector implementa-
tions is actually applicable to virtually any system. In
fact we can generalize the technique used here to an-
alyze more general controller, estimator and detectors.
Suppose the state of the estimator at time k is sk and it
evolves according to
sk+1 = f(sk,yk). (17)
Deﬁne the norm of f to be
∥f∥ ≜ sup
∆s∕=0,y,s
∥f(s,y)− f(s+∆s,y)∥
∥∆s∥
. (18)
Suppose that the defender is using the following crite-
rion to perform intrusion detection
g(sk,yk) ≶threshold, (19)
where g is an arbitrary continuous function.
Theorem 2. If ∥f∥ ≤ 1, then
lim
k→∞
g(sk, y′
k) = g(s′
k, y′
k), (20)
3For simplicity, here we consider the time the attack begins as time
0.
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k is the states variables of the virtual system.
The detection rate βk at time k converges to
lim
k→∞
βk = αk, (21)
where αk is the false alarm rate of the virtual system at
time k.
Proof. Due to space limit, we will just give an outline
of the proof. First, ∥f∥ ≤ 1 will ensure that sk con-
verges to s′
k. By the continuity of g, g(sk, y′
k) converges
to g(s′
k, y′
k). The detection rate of the system and the
false alarm rate of the virtual system are given by
βk = Prob(g(sk, y′
k) >threshold),
αk = Prob(g(s′
k, y′
k) >threshold).
(22)
Hence βk converges to αk.
The LQG controller, Kalman ﬁlter and χ2 de-
tector becomes just a special case, where the state
sk of the estimator at time k is yk−T +1,...,yk and
ˆ xk−T +1∣k−T ,..., ˆ xk∣k−1. The f function is given by (3)
and g is given by (11).
Remark5. Theconvergenceof detectionrateunderthe
replay attack to the false alarm rate indicates that the
informationgivenby thedetector will asymptoticallygo
to 0. In the other word, the detector becomes useless
and the system is not resilient to replay attack.
4. Detection of Replay Attack
As discussed in the previous section, there exist
controlsystemsthatarenotresilienttothereplayattack.
In this section, we want to design a detection strategy
against replay attacks. Throughout this section we will
always assume that A is stable.
The main problem of LQG controller and Kalman
ﬁlter is that they use a ﬁxed gain, or a gain that con-
verges really fast. Hence, the whole control system is
static in some sense. In orderto detect replay attack, we
redesign the controller as
uk = u∗
k +∆uk, (23)
where u∗
k is the optimal LQG control signal and ∆uks
are drawn from an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and covariance Q, and ∆uks are chosen to be also
independent of u∗
k. Figure 1 shows the diagram of the
whole system.
We add ∆uk as an authenticationsignal. We choose
it to be zero mean because we do not wish to introduce
anybias to xk. It is clear that withouttheattack, the con-
troller is not optimal in the LQG sense anymore, which
Plant Sensor Actuator
Attacker
z−1
Controller
Detector
Estimator
yk −Cˆ xk∣k−1
ˆ xk∣k
uk−1
monitor/control
ua
k
yk/y′
k
uk
u∗
k
Figure 1. System Diagram
meansthatinordertodetecttheattack,weneedtosacri-
ﬁce control performance. The following theorem char-
acterizes the loss of LQG performance when we inject
∆uk into the system:
Theorem 3. The LQG performance after adding ∆uk is
given by
J′ = J+trace[(U +BTSB)Q]. (24)
Proof. See the appendix.
We now wish to consider the χ2 detector after
adding the random control signal. The following the-
orem shows the effectiveness of the detector under the
modiﬁed control scheme.
Theorem 4. In the absence of an attack,
E[(yk −Cˆ xk∣k−1)TP−1(yk −Cˆ xk∣k−1)] = m. (25)
Under attack
lim
k→∞
E[(y′
k−Cˆ xk∣k−1)TP−1(y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k−1)] (26)
= m+2trace(CTP−1CU ),
where U is the solution of the following Lyapunov
equation
U −BQBT = AU A T. (27)
Proof. The ﬁrst equation is trivial to prove using Theo-
rem 1. Rewrite ˆ xk+1∣k as
ˆ xk+1∣k = A ˆ xk∣k−1+(A+BL)Ky′
k+B∆uk. (28)
For the virtual system
ˆ x′
k+1∣k = A ˆ x′
k∣k−1+(A+BL)Ky′
k+B∆u′
k. (29)
Hence,
ˆ xk∣k−1− ˆ x′
k∣k−1 =A k(ˆ x0∣−1− ˆ x′
0∣−1)+
k−1
∑
i=0
A k−i−1B(∆ui−∆u′
i).
(30)
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y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k−1 = y′
k −Cˆ x′
k∣k−1+CA k(ˆ x0∣−1− ˆ x′
0∣−1)
+C
k−1
∑
i=0
A k−i−1B(∆ui−∆u′
i).
(31)
The ﬁrst term has exactly the same distribution as yk −
Cˆ xk∣k−1. The second term will converge to 0 when A
is stable. Also ∆ui is independent of the virtual system
and for the virtual system, y′
k −Cˆ x′
k∣k−1 is independent
of ∆u′
i. Hence
lim
k→∞
Cov(y′
k−Cˆ xk∣k−1) = lim
k→∞
Cov(y′
k −Cˆ x′
k∣k−1)
+
∞
∑
i=0
Cov(CA iB∆ui)+
∞
∑
i=0
Cov(CA iB∆u′
i)
= P +2
∞
∑
i=0
CA iBQBT(A i)TCT.
By the deﬁnition of U , it is easy to see that
U =
∞
∑
i=0
A iBQBT(A i)T.
Hence, limk→∞Cov(y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k) = P +2CUCT and
lim
k→∞
E[(y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k−1)TP−1(y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k−1)]
=trace
￿
lim
k→∞
Cov(y′
k −Cˆ xk∣k)×P−1
￿
= m+2trace(CTP−1CU ).
(32)
Corollary 1. In the absence of an attack, the expecta-
tion of χ2 detector is
E(gk) = mT . (33)
Under attack, the asymptotic expectation becomes
lim
k→∞
E(gk) = mT +2trace(CTP−1CU )T . (34)
The difference in the expectation of gk illustrates
that the detection rate will not converges to the false
alarm rate, which will also be shown in the next section.
Another thing worth noticing is that to design Q, one
possible criterion is to minimize J′ −J = trace[(U +
BTSB)Q] while maximizingtrace(CTP−1CU ).
5. Simulation Result
In this section we provide some simulation results
on the detection of replay attack. Consider the control
system described in Section 2 is controlling the temper-
ature inside one room. Let Tk be the temperature of the
room at time k and T∗ to be the desired temperature.
Deﬁne the state as xk = Tk −T∗. Suppose that
xk+1 = xk +uk+wk, (35)
where uk is the input from air conditioning unit and wk
is the process noise. Suppose that just one sensor is
measuring the temperature, which is
yk = xk +vk, (36)
where vk is the measurement noise. We choose R =
0.1, Q = W = U = 1. One can compute that P =
1.092,K = 0.9161,L = −0.6180. Hence A = 0.0321
and the system is vulnerable to replay attack. The LQG
cost is J = 1.7076,J′ = J+2.618Q.
We will ﬁrst ﬁx the window size T = 5 and show
the detection rate for different Qs. We assume that the
attacker records the yks from time 1 to time 10 and then
replays it from time 11 to time 20. We also ﬁxed the
false alarm rate to be 5% at each step.
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Figure 2. Detection rate at each time step for
Q = 0.6 (blue dashed line), Q = 0.4 (brown dot
line), Q = 0.2 (red dash-dot line) and Q = 0
(black solid line).
Figure 2 shows the detection rate at each time step
for different Qs. Each detection rate is the average of
10,000 experiments. Note that the attack starts at time
11. Hence, each line starts at the false alarm rate 5%
at time 10. One can see that without additional in-
put signal, the detection rate will soon converge to 5%,
which proves that the detector is inefﬁcient for replay
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Figure 3. Detection rate at each time step for
T = 5 (blue dashed line), T = 4 (brown dot
line), T =3 (red dash-dot line) and T =2 (black
solid line).
attack. With Q = 0.6, the loss of LQG performance is
2.618×0.6/1.7076= 91% with respect to the optimal
LQG cost. As a result of the high control performance
lost, one can get more than 35% detection rate at each
step.
Next we would like to ﬁx Q = 0.6 and compare
the detection rate of different window size T . We still
assume the attack starts at time 11 and the false alarm
rate is 5%. Fig 3 shows the detection rate for different
window size. It is worth noticing that choosing a small
window size will make the detector response faster to
replay attack. However, the asymptotic detection rate
will be lower than that of larger window size. On the
other hand, by the law of large numbers, the asymptotic
detection rate will convergesto 1 as T increases. How-
ever the detector will respond very slowly to the replay
attack. For more details on the choice of window size,
please refer to [8].
6. Conclusions
In this paper we deﬁned a replay attack model on
cyber physical system and analyzed the performance of
the control system under the attack. We discovered that
for some control systems, the classical estimation, con-
trol, failure detection strategy are not resilience to the
replay attack. For such kind of system, we provide a
techniquethat can improvedetectionrate in the expense
of control performance.
7. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
To simplifynotation,let us ﬁrst deﬁnethe sigmaal-
gebra generated by yk,...,y0, ∆uk−1,...,∆u0 to be Fk.
Due to space limit, we will just list the outlines of the
proof. Before proving Theorem 3, we need the follow-
ing lemmas:
Lemma1. ThefollowingequationsaboutKalmanﬁlter
are true:
ˆ xk∣k = E(xk∣Fk),Pk∣k = E(ek∣keT
k∣k∣Fk),
where ek∣k = xk − ˆ xk∣k.
Lemma 2. The following equations are true
E(xT
k Sxk∣Fk) =trace(SPk∣k)+(ˆ xk∣k)TS ˆ xk∣k, (37)
where S is any positive semideﬁnite matrix.
Now deﬁne
JN ≜ minE
"
N−1
∑
i=0
(xT
i Wxi+uT
i Uui)
#
. (38)
BythedeﬁnitionofJ′, weknowthatJ′ =limN→∞JN/N.
Now ﬁx N, let us deﬁne
Vk(xk) ≜ minE
"
N−1
∑
k=i
(xT
i Wxi+uT
i Uui)∣Fk
#
, (39)
and VN(xN) = 0. By deﬁnition, we know that E(V0) =
JN. Also from dynamic programming, we know that Vk
satisﬁes the following backward recursive equation:
Vk(xk) = min
u∗
k
E
￿
xT
kWxk +uT
kUuk+Vk+1(xk+1)∣Fk
￿
.
(40)
Let us deﬁne
Sk−1 ≜ ATSkA+W −ATSkB(BTSkB+U)−1BTSkA,
ck−1 ≜ ck +trace[(W +ATSkA−Sk−1)Pk−1∣k−1]+trace(SkQ)
+trace[(BTSkB+U)Q],
with SN = 0, cN = 0.
Lemma 3. Vk(xk) is given by
Vk(xk) = E[xT
k Skxk∣Fk]+ck, k = N,...,0. (41)
Proof. We will use backward induction to prove (41).
First it is trivial to see that VN = 0 satisﬁes (41). Now
suppose thatVk+1 satisﬁes (41), then by (40)
Vk(xk) = minE
￿
xT
kWxk +uT
kUuk+Vk+1(xk+1)∣Fk
￿
= minE[xT
kWxk +(u∗
k +∆uk)TU(u∗
k +∆uk)
+xT
k+1Sk+1xk+1+ck+1∣Fk].
917First we know that u∗
k is measurable to Fk and ∆uk is
independent of Fk, hence
E[(u∗
k+∆uk)TU(u∗
k+∆uk)∣Fk]=(u∗
k)TUu∗
k+trace(UQ).
(42)
Then let us write xk+1 as
xk+1 = Axk +Bu∗
k +B∆uk+wk.
By the fact that ∆uk, wk are independent of Axk +Bu∗
k,
one can ﬁnally get
E(xT
k+1Sk+1xk+1∣Fk) = E(xT
k ATSk+1Axk∣Fk)+
2(u∗
k)TBTSk+1Aˆ xk∣k +(u∗
k)TBTSk+1B(u∗
k)
+trace(Sk+1Q)+trace(BTSk+1BQ).
(43)
By (42) and (43), we know that
Vk(xk) = min
u∗
k
[(u∗
k)T(U +BTSk+1B)u∗
k +2(u∗
k)TBTSk+1Aˆ xk∣k]
+E[xT
k (W +ATSk+1A)xk∣Fk]+trace(Sk+1Q)
+E(ck+1∣Fk)+trace[(BTSB+U)Q].
Hence, the optimal u∗
k is
u∗
k = −(U +BTSk+1B)−1BTSk+1Aˆ xk∣k, (44)
andVk(xk) is
Vk(xk) = (ˆ xk∣k)TATSk+1B(BTSk+1B+U)−1BTSk+1Aˆ xk∣k
+E[xT
k (W +ATSk+1A)xk∣Fk]+trace(Sk+1Q)
+ck+1+trace[(BTSk+1B+U)Q]
= E(xT
k Skxk∣Fk)+trace[(W +ATSk+1A−Sk)Pk∣k]
+ck+1+trace(Sk+1Q)+trace[(BTSk+1B+U)Q]
= E(xT
k Skxk∣Fk)+ck,
(45)
which completes the proof4.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Since
JN = EV0 = E(xT
0S0x0)+trace[
N−1
∑
k=0
(W +ATSk+1A−Sk)Pk∣k]
+trace(
N−1
∑
k=0
Sk+1Q)+trace[
N−1
∑
k=0
(BTSk+1B+U)Q],
we know that
J′ = lim
N→∞
JN/N =trace[(W +ATSA−S)(P−KCP)]+trace(SQ)
+trace[(BTSB+U)Q]= J+trace[(BTSB+U)Q].
(46)
4We use Lemma 2 in the second equality.
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